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J. RODNEY JOHNSON 
Drafting for the Optimum Marital Deduction 
WHILE the marital deduction provided for by federal estate tax law may not necessarily be 
the controlling factor in planning the will of a married 
person, it is certainly one of the most important factors 
because of the sheer magnitude of this deduction-
up to 50% of the adjusted gross estate.1 A direct 
consequence of this importance is reflected in the fact 
that the marital deduction has become the most 
written-about topic in the estate planning area. Most 
of what has been written about this subject can be 
divided into the two following categories: ( 1 ) an 
explanation of the operation of the marital deduction 
or one of its facets; or ( 2) a discussion of how to 
obtain the maximum marital deduction through the 
use of one of several competing formula clauses. 
The Maximum vs. The Optimum Deduction 
Some estate planners are beginning to suggest that 
those of their brethren who find themselves regularly 
focusing on this latter goal of maximizing the marital-
1 IRC 2056. 
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deduction, as an end unto itself, may be suffering from 
a form of estate planner's myopia. They are taking 
the position that instead of focusing on the maximum 
amount that can be transferred tax-free to the wife, 
counsel should recognize that the proper ambit of 
his task in the typical case is to maximize the amount 
of his client's estate that will end up in the hands of 
the ultimate beneficiaries (usually the children) , after 
having insured that the wife is adequately provided 
for during her life and has the degree of control over 
the ultimate disposition of the assets that is consistent 
with the husband's plan. What counsel should be seek-
3 
ing then is not the smallest possible tax bill at the death 
of the husband. Rather, he should be seeking to 
minimize the total estate tax burden imposed on the 
husband's assets as they pass from him, through his 
wife, to the ultimate beneficiaries. Assuming that the 
desired goal is to achieve the lowest overall tax bill 
(the sum of the taxes at the husband's death and 
at the wife's death plus an interest factor if appro-
priate), it is quite simple to conclude that instead of 
striving for the maximum marital deduction, counsel 
should be searching for the optimal transfer from hus-
band to wife-the amount that will "set the stage," 
so to speak, for the lowest overall tax bill even though 
it may not take full advantage of the marital de-
duction. 
The Present Practice 
Before looking at a possible method of optimizing 
the marital deduction it may be helpful to review the 
present practice attributed to most estate planners. It 
appears that the standard approach of virtually every 
draftsman today is to more or less automatically take 
the maximum marital deduction except in those cases 
where the wife has an estate of her own. In these 
latter cases, the conventional wisdom suggests that 
she should be given enough of her husband's estate so 
that their separate estates will be approximately equal. 
How well does this approach work? A recently pub-
lished study, presenting the results of a computer 
simulation of thousands of cases, concludes that this 
" ... indiscriminate use of the marital deduction can 
nullify all the other estate planning that the taxpayer 
has done."2 The variables used in this study were as 
follows: 
(a) The size of the decedent's estate was varied 
(by increments of $200,000) from $200,000 to 
$2,000,000. 
(b) The size of the survivor's estate was also varied 
(by increments of $200,000) from $200,000 to 
$2,000,000. 
( c) The after-tax rate of return of the survivor 
was varied (by increments of 6%) from 0% to 30%. 
( d) The after-tax rate of return of the other bene-
ficiaries was also varied (by increments of 6%) from 
0% to 30%. 
( e) The remaining life of the survivor after the 
decedent's death was varied (by increments of three 
years) from one to twenty-two years. 
2 Schnee, An Analysis of the Optimum Marital Deduction, 
The Tax Adviser, pp, 222, 230 (April 1974). 
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(£) The percentages of the decedent's estate trans-
ferred to the survivor were 0%, 20%, 40%, 50%, 
60%, 80% and 100%. 
Varying each of the above factors independently of 
the others, the author generated a total of 28,000 cases 
and the following results: 
( 1 ) The present practice of taking the maximum 
marital deduction would have resulted in obtaining 
the optimal transfer in only 10% of the cases; 
( 2 ) In 55 % of the cases the optimal amount to 
have transferred would have been zero; and 
( 3) In 21 % of the cases the optimal amount to 
have transferred would have been 100%. 
A Proposed Solution 
Although the author of the above study suggests 
some general rules to guide the estate planner in his 
search for the optimal trans£ er in any given case, it 
is believed that there may be a simpler and more ac-
curate way to accomplish this goal. Two of America's 
greatest estate planning authorities, W. Barton Leach 
and Jam es K. Logan, speaking generally about the 
tendency of some testators to make too rigid disposi-
tions and the need for flexibility in an estate plan, 
had the following observation to make. 
To regulate events in 1980, the judgment of a 
mediocre mind on the spot is incomparably 
preferable to the guess in 1960 of the greatest 
man who ever lived.3 
Capitalizing on this observation, it would seem 
that the ideal solution for the present problem is 
simply to postpone determining the amount of the 
transfer until most of the variables have either be-
come known or at least become estimable with a 
greater degree of accuracy. Specifically, counsel would 
wait until approximately seven or eight months4 after 
the decedent's death to determine how much he will 
in fact transfer to his surviving spouse. This post-
mortem determination is accomplished by leaving the 
entire estate to the wife and then allowing her (with 
advice of counsel) to determine the optimal transfer 
and then disclaim ownership or refuse to accept the 
remaining portion of her husband's estate. 
3 Leach & Logan Future Interests and Estate Planning, 
p. 241 (Foundation Press 1961). 
4 This time period is chosen in order to allow sufficient 
time after the alternate valuation date has passed within 
which to make the decision. 
Counsel wishing to structure a will to take advan-
tage of this option will find that it requires very few 
changes to his basic marital-deduction will form. He 
would begin just as usual, to-wit: 
(a) Divide the estate into two shares with what-
ever formula clause is regularly used, the appropriate 
share going into the "Marital" trust and the other 
share going into the "Family" trust. 
(b) The "Marital" trust will provide that 
( 1 ) Wife gets all income for life, 
( 2) Trustee has power to invade corpus for 
wife's benefit, and 
( 3) Wife has an inter vivas and testamentary 
general power of appointment over the 
corpus with a remainder to the "Family" 
trust to the extent that wife fails to exer-
cise her power. 
( c) The "Family" trust will provide that 
( 1 ) Wife gets all of the income for life, 
( 2) Trustee has power to invade corpus for 
wife's benefit, but 
( 3) Instead of giving wife a special testa-
mentary power of appointment exercis-
able among the children, she is given an 
inter vivas and testamentary general 
power of appointment. 
Will the consequence of giving wife a general, in-
stead of a special, power of appointment over the 
family trust be to cause all of husband's estate to be 
included in her estate at her death? The answer of 
course is yes-if she accept<> the power. However, the 
plan is that she will not accept the power unless she 
determines that 100% of her husband's estate would 
be the optimal trans£ er to her under the circumstances 
then existing. If the final computations lead counsel 
to conclude that the opitmal transfer would have 
been 50% of the adjusted gross estate, she would 
simply release her general power of appointment inso-
far as it allows her to appoint to herself, her estate, 
her creditors, or the creditors of her estate. Such a 
release (i.e. releasing her general power of appoint-
ment into a special power of appointment) has been 
recognized in Virginia for over thirty years.5 Will this 
release result in any gift tax liability on the part of 
the wife? No. Generally speaking, the release of a 
5 Section 55-279(2) (b) Va. Code Ann. (1950). 
general power of appointment is treated as an exercise 
and therefore deemed a transfer of property. Thus 
a releasor of a general power of appointment is or-
dinarily exposed to a gift tax liability. However, for 
almost twenty-five years Virginia law has provided 
that the release above suggested would operate as a 
disclaimer6 and federal law specifically provides that 
" (a) disclaimer or renunciation of such a (i.e. a 
general) power of appointment shall not be deemed 
a release of such power."7 Must wife give up her 
income interest in order to disclaim her general power 
of appointment? Again the answer is no. The regu-
lations state that one may disclaim a general power 
of appointment without disclaiming "other interests"8 
and it is clear from a reading of these regulations that 
a life right to income would be encompassed in the 
phrase "other interests." These same regulations also 
recognize the possibility of making partial disclaimers 
in those jurisdictions where they are effective under 
local law. Virginia law does permit partial releases 
and provides that they shall operate as disclaimers if 
made before acceptance and within the appropriate 
time.9 Thus if it is determined that the optimal transfer 
to wife is 75% of husband's estate, wife would simply 
accept the marital trust, her income right under the 
family trust, her general power of appointment over 
one-half of the family trust, but release (disclaim) her 
general power into a special power over the other half 
of the family trust. Or, if the optimal transfer is de-
termined to be only 20% of husband's estate, wife 
would release (disclaim) her general power into a 
special power insofar as the entire family trust is con-
cerned and also over 60% of the marital trust, while 
retaining her income rights in both trusts. 
Timing Is Critical 
Whenever one wishes to make a disclaimer in order 
to obtain a federal tax advantage it is necessary to 
recognize that, while there may be several limitation 
periods involved, one of them-the federal one-is 
always going to control the tax consequences of the 
disclaimer. Here we have a good example of differing 
state and federal rules. Virginia law recognizes an 
outer limit of two years in which to disclaim a power 
of appointment10 whereas the federal regulations pro-
6 Section 55-286.1 Va. Code Ann. ( 1950). 
1 IRC 2514(b). 
B IRC Regulation 25.2514-3 ( c) ( 5). 
9 Sections 55-279(2) and 55-286.1 Va. Code Ann. (1950). 
10 Section 55-286.1 Va. Code Ann. ( 1950). 
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vide that " ( i) n the absence of facts to the contrary, 
the failure to renounce or disclaim within a reason-
able time after learning of its existence will be pre-
sumed to constitute an acceptance of the power."11 
It is believed that the seven to eight month time period 
suggested above will be acceptable as a reasonable 
time and thus keep the presumption of acceptance 
from arising. It should be noted that all of the in-
formation (e.g. alternate values) will not be available 
to the survivor until at least six months after the de-
cedent's death. Therefore, from a practical standpoint, 
all that is being envisioned is a one or two month 
period within which to make the decision after all of 
the relevant facts have been ascertained. 
Other Opportunities 
So far this discussion has been restricted to a con-
sideration of disclaiming powers of appointment as a 
means of trans£ erring the optimal amount to the sur-
viving spouse. It should be reasonably clear, however, 
that the well-settled Virginia law12 relating to dis-
claimers of property interests will also allow wife to 
disclaim all or any portion of her income interest in 
either of the trusts involved. Similarly, in the event 
that the estate plan does not call for the use of the 
management potential offered by a professional trus-
tee, husband can simply leave his entire estate to wife 
outright, with a proviso that any property interest she 
might disclaim will pass instead to the children, etc., 
with a contingent trust to serve as a receptacle if 
any of the.potential beneficiaries are under age. 
Several Problems 
While the present practice of giving the surviving 
spouse only a special power of appointment over the 
family trust may often fail to achieve the optimal 
transfer, it does at least guarantee that a portion of 
husband's estate will be preserved for the children 
except to the extent that the trustee has invaded the 
corpus to respond to actual needs of the wife. 
The most obvious problem with the plan suggested 
herein is its reliance upon action to be taken by the 
surviving spouse at a time when her husband's in-
fluence is no longer a factor. Counsel might well 
advise her that the optimal trans£ er is 25 % and 
therefore recommend that she disclaim her power 
over 75% of her husband's estate. However, there is 
11 IRC Regulation 25.2514-3 ( c) ( 5). 
12 Sections 64.1-188 through 64.1-196 Va. Code Ann. 
(1950). 
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no way to insure that she will follow his recommenda-
tion. She may elect to retain the entire estate with the 
ultimate result that nothing may pass to the children. 
Whether taking this risk is justified in a given case 
will of course be a decision for the client to make after 
thorough discussion with counsel. 
A second potential problem arises in those cases 
where wife may become incompetent concurrent with 
or shortly after husband's death and thus be unable 
to execute a disclaimer of her power. While this set of 
facts is not expected to occur frequently, the careful 
estate planner wishing to avoid the possibility of be-
coming "locked in" in such a case might provide that · 
the general power of appointment over the family 
trust is conditional upon wife being able to exercise 
it. Language along the following lines should suffice: 
In the event that my wife, Jane Deaux, 
should be declared incompetent within eight 
months after my death without having made 
a positive acceptance of the general power of 
appointment given her over this Family Trust, 
then such power shall terminate and she shall 
instead have only a power to appoint the Cor-
pus of this Family Trust among such of my 
children, in such portions, outright or in fur-
ther trust, as she in her last will and testa-
ment expressly ref erring to this power shall 
deem appropriate; and in default of exercise 
of this power, the Corpus of the Family Trust 
shall be distributed as follows: 
It is believed that the above clause will result in a 
restoration of the status quo, that is, no problem will 
have been caused by the giving to her of the complete 
power where she is unable to exercise it because it is 
taken away from her under these circumstances.13 
Is it necessary to take such a conservative approach 
in the disability cases? The possibility has been raised 
of giving wife's power to disclaim to her guardian, 
to be exercised for her if determined in the best in-
terest of the plan, in these cases. In theory this is 
quite sound. All that is being done is simply making 
a conditional gift of a collateral power of appointment 
to her guardian. Generally a guardian would be quite 
hesitant to participate in the giving away of his ward's 
powers or property. However, where, as here, ( 1 ) 
13 In order to completely restore the status quo, counsel 
would also want to make provision for the trustee to be able 
to invade the corpus for the benefit of the children in such a 
case. Counsel would not want to make either of these amend-
ments to the marital trust. They would cause the disallowance 
of the marital deduction because they would transform Wife's 
interest into a "terminable interest" under IRC 2056 ( b). 
(Continued on page 21) 
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Marital Deduction (Continued from page 6) 
into two separate trusts. The essence of the present 
plan can be incorporated into that form by simply 
changing one word. This change will result in leaving 
the portion "open-ended." Instead of giving the sur-
viving spouse a general power over "one-half" of the 
trust, she is given a general power over "all" of the 
trust. She can then proceed on to determine the 
optimal transfer during the post-mortem period as sug-
gested above and release (disclaim) accordingly. 
the ward has no foreseeable personal need for the 
property subject to the power, ( 2) the disclaimer is 
pursuant to a plan agreed upon by the ward when 
she was competent, and ( 3) the disclaimer is clearly 
in the best interests of the ward's family unit from a 
tax standpoint, there should not be such hesitancy. 
Application To Smaller Estates 
One should not infer from the foregoing discussion 
that the plan herein suggested is confined to the larger 
estates. This concept has potential benefit for any 
estate where the marital-deduction will be a factor 
and it lends itself to incorporation into the smaller 
estate plans just as easily as it does the larger ones. 
For instance, in an earlier issue of the ] ournal, 14 
a "simple" marital deduction will form was sug-
gested for moderate estates which involved dividing 
an estate into two portions of one trust rather than 
14 Johnson, Simplifying the Marital Deduction, 1 Va. Bar 
Ass'n. J. 12 (January 1975). 
Conclusion 
It is quite possible that the present practice m 
drafting for the marital deduction may not be as 
dramatically erroneous as the computer study referred 
to earlier has concluded. Nevertheless it is submitted 
that all those whose practice includes administration 
of estates regularly come across estates where far too 
much or far too little has been transferred through the 
use of standard clauses. It would seem then that, all 
other things being equal, it would be incomparably 
preferable to leave the determination of the optimal 
transfer to those who will be on the spot at the time 
for the transfer to occur. 
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